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INSURANCE LAW
by
Jeff Dykes* and Otway B. Denny, Jr. **

I.

HEALTH, LIFE, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

T7XCLUSIONSfrom Coverage. Three cases during the survey perod dealt with policy clauses excluding certain risks from coverage.
LIEntzminger v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. I involved
the construction and application of an aviation exclusion clause in the accidental death portion of a group life and accidental death insurance policy. The insured, a major in the Texas Air National Guard, died in the
crash of a military aircraft during a Guard sortie that was one of a minimum number of missions the officer was required to log each month. The
insurer refused to pay the $25,000 accidental death indemnity on the
grounds that the flight was excluded under a clause in the policy denying
coverage for loss caused by a training flight. 2 The beneficiaries sued, arguing that the policy's exclusionary provision was ambiguous, in that "training" could mean either student flight or flying by an experienced pilot to
prevent loss of skills. The beneficiaries also claimed the provision did not
give fair notice to them of what was excluded in the policy.
The court found the exclusion to be clear and unambiguous and to provide fair notice as a matter of law. 3 The court stated that in the absence of
a policy provision showing the parties intended the term "training" to be
used in the sense claimed by the beneficiaries, the court must give the word
its generally understood meaning, and concluded that the exclusion applied to any aviation training purpose. 4 The beneficiaries also relied upon
the testimony of the insurance company's own representative, who testified
that the policy was not meant to have a military exclusion. The beneficiaries argued that if proficiency flight were included in the definition of
"training," the policy would exclude all military flight from coverage. The
*

B.A., M.A., Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Ful-

bright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
**
B.A., Texas A&M University; J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Fulbright
& Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Katherine D. Hunt, Attorney at
Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas, in the preparation of this Article.
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2. The exclusion read: "No Accidental Death or Dismemberment Insurance will be
payable for any loss caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly by: .

aircraft operated for any training or testing or experimental purpose .
3. Id. at 537.
4. Id at 536-37.

. .

. 2. flight in an

Id at 536.
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court ruled that this testimony could not be used to contradict the clearly
stated intention of the parties, as shown in the contract. 5 Finally, the court
held that if no ambiguity exists, parol evidence is not admissible to create
6
an ambiguity.
McFadden v. American United Life Insurance Co. 7 involved interpreta-

tion of a dental exclusion. The insured brought suit against American to
recover expenses incurred for oral surgery to repair a condition known as
retrographic mandible. The trial court granted summary judgment for
American, and the court of civil appeals affirmed. 8 The insured's policy
with American, which he obtained through his employer, contained a dental exclusion. 9 In the trial court the plaintiff relied upon the affidavit of the
treating dentist, who described the procedure as an operation on the mandible, or jaw, and stated that it had nothing to do with the teeth. The
insurer relied upon the deposition and affidavit of another dentist, who
stated that the procedure was dental surgery and that the purpose of the
surgery was to realign the teeth. Thus the insurer claimed the surgery was
not covered under the policy.
The court of appeals relied on a state statute' 0 and one case to define
dentistry as including jaw surgery.' It ruled that summary judgment was
proper because surgery for a retrographic mandible was excluded as a
matter of law under the policy.' 2 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
summary judgment, however, holding that the conflicting affidavits cre-13
ated a fact issue for the jury to decide as to the purpose of the surgery.
In Sekel v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 14 Richard Sekel fell at his home
and sustained a fatal blow to his head. The autopsy showed that he had a
5. Id. at 537.
6. Id (citing Eggert v. American Standard Life Ins. Co., 404 S.W.2d 99, 104 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no writ)).
7. 658 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. 1983).
8. 643 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982).

9. The exclusion read: "This insurance does not provide any benefits for charges...

incurred for dentures, dentistry or dental surgery, except as required for treatment of accidental injuries to natural teeth." 658 S.W.2d at 147.
10. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 455la(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984) states:

Any person shall be regarded as practicing dentistry within the meaning of
this Chapter:
(2) Who shall offer or undertake by any means or methods whatsoever, to
clean teeth or to remove stains, concretions or deposits from teeth in the
human mouth, or who shall undertake or offer to diagnose, treat, operate, or
prescribe by any means or methods for any disease, pain, injury, deficiency,
deformity, or physical condition of the human teeth, oral cavity, alveolar process, gums, or jaws.
11. The court of appeals stated: "Dentistry has been defined by statute and reiterated in
at least one case as 'undertaking and offering to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe by any
means or methods for any disease, pain, injury, deficiency, deformity, orphysicalcondition of
the human teeth, oral cavity, alveolar process, gums orjaws.' " 643 S.W.2d at 233 (quoting
Kelley v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 467 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972)) (emphasis added by court).

12. 643 S.W.2d at 233.
13. 658 S.W.2d at 148.

14. 704 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1983).
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severe atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease that probably caused the fall.' 5 The accident benefits coverage clause in his group
life and accidental death policy provided that Aetna would pay the benefits under certain conditions.' 6 An exclusion clause prohibited payment
when bodily infirmity or disease contributed to an injury resulting in loss
even when accident was a proximate or precipitating cause. 17 Aetna
claimed that this exclusion clause prevented the recovery of accidental
death benefits.
The court noted the similarity of this clause to one restricting coverage
to loss caused "directly and independently" or "independently and exclusively" by an accident. Texas courts have construed this latter type of
clause to preclude recovery when disease and bodily infirmity is a concurrent proximate cause of death,' 8 but if the disease is a remote cause, the
courts have not barred recovery.' 9 The court pointed out, however, that
the Texas Supreme Court has recognized two types of exclusion clauses,
those that exclude coverage only when the disease is a proximate cause,
and those that also exclude it when the disease is a more remote cause of
the subsequent loss. 20 In Sekel the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the Aetna exclusion clause fell into the second category. 2 ' The court
held that the clause barred coverage where a risk excluded by the policy is
a functionally, closely related significant cause or contributing factor to the
loss, even if a covered risk is a proximate and more immediate precipitating cause. 22 According to the court, a contrary result would disregard the
clear and unambiguous meaning of the exclusion clause. 23 The judges
maintained that the exclusion provision would be meaningless unless it
precluded recovery in at least some cases where the causal or contributory
15. The autopsy report stated: "In our opinion Richard Sekel ... died from severe
The initiating event was probably an arrhythemia ... secondary to the
head trauma ....
victim's very severe hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease . . . . Therefore, the victim probably passed out because of his natural disease processes and subsequently struck his head when he fell." Id at 1336.
16. The coverage clause provided that Aetna would pay if the insured suffered a "bodily injury caused by an accident and as a direct result of such injury and, to the exclusion of
all other causes, sustains within not more than ninety days. . . any of the losses [covered]."
Id.
17. The exclusion clause stated:
The insurance provided under this Title does not include, and no payments
shall be made for, any loss resulting from any injury caused or contributed to
by, or as a consequence of, any of the following excluded risks, even though
the proximate or precipitating cause of loss is accidental bodily injury:
(a) bodily or mental infirmity; or
(b) disease.
Id. at 1336-37.
18. See Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Hudman, 398 S.W.2d 110, 115 (Tex.
1965) (when overexertion and diseased heart concurrently caused death, death not covered
by insurance policy limiting coverage to accidental injury independent of other causes).
19. See Stroburg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 464 S.W.2d 827, 830-31 (Tex. 1971).
20. 704 F.2d at 1337; see Stroburg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 464 S.W.2d 827, 831-32
(Tex. 1971).
21. 704 F.2d at 1338.
22. Id.
23. Id
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relationship between the death and disease was less than proximate. 24 The
court noted that other jurisdictions' constructions support this interpretation of the "even though" phrase. 25 The court distinguished an earlier case
applying Texas law, Zorn v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. ,26 which denied coverage under an almost identical exclusion clause because "bodily infirmity" concurred with an accident in causing the insured's death. 27 The
Sekel court found that Zorn did not reach the issue of whether a nonproximate cause would have barred recovery; therefore, the Fifth Circuit was
28
free to refer to other jurisdictions' decisions.
Choice of Laws. The Fifth Circuit dealt with one case on choice of laws
during the survey period. In New York Lfe Insurance Co. v. Baum 29 the

Fifth Circuit had to determine whether Texas conflict of laws rules required the application of New-York or Louisiana law to an insurance policy before it could decide which of two claimants was the proper
beneficiary. The evidence showed that the insured signed the insurance
application in Louisiana and that his physical examination took place in
Louisiana. New York Life issued and executed the policy in New York,
however, and premiums were paid to the company in exchange for a receipt signed by the president of the company or its secretary in New York.
The district court, relying on Texas conflict of laws provisions, ruled that
Louisiana law applied to this case, and that the policy was void because
neither claimed beneficiary had an insurable interest under Louisiana
law. 30 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that the contract was made in
New York and most of its performance was to have taken place there.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that New York law governed. 3'
In so holding, the Fifth Circuit noted the validity of two early Texas
Supreme Court cases. In Seiders v. Merchants Life Association32 the court
held that where an insurance contract provided that the principal and premiums be paid in an insurance company's home office in Missouri, even
33
though the contract was actually made in Texas, Missouri law controlled.
In Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Harris34 the court noted that the test
is governed by the final agreement of minds, which concludes the contract.
24. Id at 1339-40.
25.

Id at 1340; see Britt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 336, 342-43 (5th Cir. 1977),

modified, 566 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Mississippi law); Huff v. Aetna

Life Ins. Co., 120 Ariz. 548, 587 P.2d 267, 270-71 (Ct. App. 1978); cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Kegley, 389 F.2d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968) (clause denying
recovery if disease contributed to loss is attempt to place heavier burden on insured, but is
limited by public policy). The Sekel court drew support for its interpretation from dictum in
Kegley. 704 F.2d at 1340 n.6.
26. 260 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tex. 1965), aft'dper curiam, 368 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1966).
27. Id at 732-33.
28. 704 F.2d at 1340 n.6.
29. 700 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1983).
30. Id at 930.
31. Id. at 933.
32. 93 Tex. 194, 54 S.W. 753 (1900).
33. Id at 198-99, 54 S.W. at 754.
34. 94 Tex. 25, 57 S.W. 635 (1900).
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The place where the agreement occurs is the place where the contract generally is made. 35 Applying these cases, the Fifth Circuit held that, under
Texas law, if an agent must verify to his satisfaction a certain condition of
the insured prior to delivering the insurance contract, the making of the
contract occurs where the insured resides. 36 Where delivery of the policy
is unconditional, however, the contract
is deemed to have been made at the
37
domicile of the insurance company.
II.

LIABILITY INSURANCE

Nonowner's Policy Endorsement. In Dairyland County Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Childress 38 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a nonowner's policy endorsement covered a car furnished for the regular use of
the named insured but not owned by him, and whether injured plaintiffs
were bound by a declaratory judgment action to which they were not parties. Dairyland involved a suit by plaintiffs injured in an automobile accident against the driver's insurer. In a prior proceeding the plaintiffs
obtained a judgment against the insured, who was driving his girlfriend's
car when the accident occurred. In addition, the insurer had filed a declaratory judgment action claiming that the insured's nonowner's policy did
not cover an automobile furnished to the insured for his regular use and
had received an agreed judgment declaring that the insured was not covered in this case. The injured plaintiffs, however, were not parties to this
declaratory judgment action. After securing a judgment against the insured, the injured plaintiffs sued Dairyland, the insurer, for the amount of
the judgment, as well as for attorney's fees. The trial court found that the
plaintiffs were bound by the agreed judgment in the suit between the insured and the insurer, and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court
of appeals reversed, granting
the plaintiffs judgment for the policy limits
39
and for attorney's fees.
In affirming the court of appeals decision, the Texas Supreme Court
considered whether the named insured's nonowner's policy covered a car
furnished for his regular use but not owned by him. In the trial court the
35. Id at 35, 57 S.W. at 638.
36. 700 F.2d at 932.
37. Id. The district court had disregarded Seiders and Fidelity because it believed a firm
"home office" rule had been rejected in Texas. The court relied on TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
art. 21.42 (Vernon 1963), which provides that Texas laws govern an insurance contract payable to a Texas citizen or inhabitant when the insurer is doing business in Texas. 700 F.2d at
933. The Fifth Circuit said art. 21.42 did not apply to the Baum policy for several reasons.
First, the identity of the beneficiary, the fundamental issue in Baum, must be known before
art. 21.42 can be applied. Id. Second, the original beneficiary was a Louisiana resident. Id
Third, Texas courts have interpreted art. 21.42 to apply only when the insurance contract is
made in the course of the company's Texas business, which the court said was not the case
here. Id (citing Howell v. American Live Stock Ins. Co., 483 F.2d 1354, 1361 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Texas statutes do not apply in suit to recover on policy insuring horse where contract was
made in New Mexico and horse was kept in New Mexico); Austin Bldg. Co. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Tex. 1968) (art. 21.42 has no extraterritorial
effect; Kansas law controls where parties contracted in that state with Kansas citizen)).
38. 650 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1983).
39. 636 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982).
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jury had found that the automobile was furnished to the insured for his
regular use. Dairyland contended that the finding precluded coverage,
basing its reasoning on the definition of nonowned automobiles in the policy, which excluded coverage for cars either owned by the named insured
or furnished for his regular use. 40 A nonowner's endorsement attached to
the policy, however, precluded coverage only for cars owned by the insured. 4 1 The supreme court held that the policy did provide liability
cov42
erage for the insured while he drove his girlfriend's automobile.
Turning to the insurance company's res judicata and collateral estoppel
defenses, the supreme court held that the agreed declaratory judgment between the insurer and insured did not bind the injured plaintiffs. 4 3 The
court rejected Dairyland's claim that the plaintiffs' suit was derivative of
the insured's coverage and that as such they were in privity with the insured. The court said that the plaintiffs could exercise no control over the
44
declaratory judgment action and therefore were not bound by its result.
Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorney's fees under article 2226 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which
allows such fees to parties who have a valid claim against a person as a
result of a suit founded on an oral or written contract. 45 Dairyland contended that the plaintiffs' suit was to enforce the judgment and was, therefore, not founded on an oral or written contract. The court initially
determined that Dairyland, as a county mutual insurance company, was
not one of the insurers exempt from the provisions of article 2226.46 The
court stated that in Texas a third person not a party to a contract has a
cause of action to enforce the contract if the contract was made for that
40. The definition in the policy read: "Non-owned automobile means an automobile
...not owned by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any
relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile." 650 S.W.2d at 773.
41. The court stated:
[T]he non-owner's endorsement. . . states that it becomes a part of the policy
to which it is attached, that the insurance . . . for bodily injury liability and
personal property damage liability applies with respect to the use of any automobile by or in behalf of the named insured subject to the following provisions:
2. The insurance does not apply
(a) to any automobile owned by the named insured.
Id. (emphasis in original).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 774.
44. Id.
45. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
46. 650 S.W.2d at 775. Article 2226 states:
The provisions hereof shall not apply to contracts of insurance issued by insurers subject to the provisions of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act
(Article 21.21-2, Insurance Code), nor shall it apply to contracts of any insurer subject to the provisions of Article 3.62, Insurance Code, or to Chapter
387, Acts of the 55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957, as amended (Article
3.62-1, Vernon's Texas Insurance Code), or to Article 21.21, Insurance Code,
as amended, or to Chapter 9, Insurance Code, as amended, and each such
article or chapter shall be and remain in full force and effect.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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person's benefit.47 The court said that allowing such a person to sue for
attorney's fees is a logical extension of this rule, if the claim is not excluded
by the statutory exemptions. 4 8 The plaintiffs in Dairyland qualified as
third-party beneficiaries because the compulsory insurance requirement of
Texas motor vehicle safety laws implies that all potential claimants for
damages resulting from automobile accidents are intended as beneficiaries
of statutorily required automobile liability coverage. 49 Thus the court held
that the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the contract between the insured
attorand the carrier, Dairyland, and that they were also entitled to seek
50
ney's fees under article 2226 for actions founded upon contract.
A viation Liability. In Marr's Shortstop of Texas, Inc. v. United States Fire
Insurance Co. 51 the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the
pilot of an airplane that crashed, killing all aboard, was properly rated for
52
the flight within the meaning of the aviation liability insurance policy.
The trial court submitted two issues to the jury. The first issue asked
whether the weather conditions at the beginning of the flight required the
use of instrument flight rules (IFR).5 3 The second issue asked whether or
not the pilot knew that he would be flying in IFR weather conditions at the
beginning of the flight. The jury found that visual flight rules (VFR) conditions existed at the time of takeoff, but that the pilot knew when he took
off that he would be flying in IFR conditions some time before the end of
the flight. Under the policy, the first answer supported the owner, while
the second answer supported the insurer. The trial court disregarded the
first answer and rendered judgment for the insurance company. The court
of appeals found that Texas precedent required the flight to be characterized at its inception and that the jury's answer to the second issue was
therefore immaterial. 54 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the in47. 650 S.W.2d at 775; see Quilter v. Wendland, 403 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. 1966); Knox
v. Ball, 144 Tex. 402, 409, 191 S.W.2d 17, 21 (1945).
48. 650 S.W.2d at 775.
49. Id. at 775-76; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h, §§ 1(10), IA, 2(b), 5, 32
(Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1984).
50. 650 S.W.2d at 776.
51. 643 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1982, writ granted).
52. The policy contained the following pilot clause: "Only the following pilot or pilots
holding valid and effective pilot and medical certificates with ratings as required by the
Federal Aviation Administration for the flight involved will operate the aircraft in flight:
Ronald Eugene Marr." Id. at 515 n.1.
53. 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.3(e), 91.115 (1983).
54. 643 S.W.2d at 516; see Glover v. National Ins. Underwriters, 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.
1977). The supreme court in Glover stated:
The remaining question is whether the flight of the . . . aircraft in this case
was a VFR flight, for which the pilot was properly rated, or an IFR flight, for
which he was not. The answer to this question depends on at what point in
time the status of the flight should be determined. We have concluded, as did

the King Craft court [see National Ins. Underwriters v. King Craft Custom
Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ala. 1973), affdper curiam, 488 F.2d 1393
(5th Cir. 1974)] that the flight should be characterized as of its inception. The
weather conditions at the beginning of the flight should thus be looked to in

determining whether the flight is a VFR flight or an IFR flight.
545 S.W.2d at 762.
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surance company had failed to prove the pilot was not properly rated for
the flight. 5 The Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ in his case but
6
has not yet rendered a decision.
Limitation to "Household" In Brown v. Tucker 57 Stephen Craig Stubbs, a
passenger injured in an automobile accident, sued under the uninsured
motorist coverage issued to his stepfather, Glen A. Brown. Stubbs had to
show that he was a resident of Brown's household in order to recover.5 8 At
the time of the accident Stubbs had been living in a trailer five miles from
his stepfather's home, but some testimony indicated this arrangement was
temporary. During deliberations the jury asked for a definition of the term
"household." At the carrier's request the trial court defined the term as
"those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family." 59 The
plaintiff
to this definition and asked that household be defined as
"a familyobjected
or a group
of persons who habitually reside under one roof and
form one domestic circle."'60 Rejecting the plaintiffs contention that the
definition as submitted placed too much emphasis on geographical location, the court of appeals found that the two definitions were so nearly the
same that it was doubtful the jury could have been misled. The court
ruled, therefore, that1 the trial court did not abuse its discretion in submit6
ting the definition.
Construction ofEndorsement. In All Star Van & Storage v. Admiral Storage
& Van, Inc.62 the insurance carriers for two moving companies, All Star
and Admiral, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine which
policy of insurance applied to a loss. The case involved a truck, owned by
All Star but leased by Admiral, that damaged a Border Patrol Station
when Admiral used the truck to transport some of its property. The Fireman's Fund policy issued to All Star provided coverage when the truck
was operated by another with permission of the owner, All Star. The policy contained an endorsement, however, that limited its coverage to persons who do not carry liability insurance required by law and who do not
transport property for the named insured or others. 63 All Star and Fireman's Fund claimed that the endorsement excluded coverage to Admiral
because Admiral held a common carrier permit from the Texas Railroad
Commission and was, therefore, required to carry liability insurance cov55. 643 S.W.2d at 516.
56. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 456 (June 15, 1983).
57. 652 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.) 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. Id. at 494.
59. Id. at 495; see Travelers Indem. Co. v. American Indem. Co., 315 S.W.2d 677, 68081 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, no writ).
60. 652 S.W.2d at 495.
61. Id
62. 658 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ refd).
63. The text of the exclusion read: "IT]he insurance does not cover as an insured any
person or organization, or any agent, employee or contractor thereof, who is required to
carry liability insurance under any motor carrier law because of transporting property for
the named insured or for others." Id. at 214.
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erage. 64 Admiral and its carrier argued that the endorsement did not apply because Admiral was transporting its own property at the time of the
accident, not property of the named insured or others.
The court of appeals said that the policy was subject to two constructions. The endorsement could apply to any carrier required to have liability insurance, or it could apply only to the transportation of property of the
named insured or others. 65 The first construction was the proper one, the
court found, reasoning that the purpose of the statutory liability insurance
requirement is to protect the public, and to conclude that coverage goes on
and off depending on whose property was being transported would not be
in the public interest. 66 The court's opinion was that Fireman's intended
to avoid giving additional coverage under its policy to motor carriers who
already had the insurance required by the statute. The court concluded
that the driver of the Admiral truck and Admiral were not covered under
67
the insurance policy issued to the truck's owner by Fireman's.
III.

PROPERTY INSURANCE

"Bad Faith" Claims for ExtracontractualDamages. In one of the most
important cases of the past decade, English v. Fischer, 68 the Texas Supreme
Court refused to read into every Texas contract an "implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing," the breach of which would give rise to a tort
action for damages beyond the usual contractual measure. 69 The California Supreme Court created the "bad faith" tort action in 1973 in Gruenberg
v. Aetna Insurance Co. 70 In Gruenberg a restaurant owner suffered a fire
loss and made a claim under his fire policies. The fire insurers, suspecting
arson, began an investigation and engaged counsel to examine the insured
under oath in accordance with the policy terms. The authorities initiated a
criminal arson prosecution against the insured, which was later dismissed.
During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the insured refused to
64. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 911b, § 13 (Vernon 1964).

65. 658 S.W.2d at 215.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
69. Id. at 522-23.
70. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). Before Gruenberg the
California courts had recognized a cause of action against insurers for damages beyond the
policy limits in liability policy cases in which the insurer had acted in bad faith in failing to
settle a claim against the insured within policy limits. Eg., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66
Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198, 200-01 (1958). Texas courts have recognized a similar
cause of action against liability insurers, but the standard of care in Texas had been the
familiar negligence standard rather than "good faith." G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
Gruenberg was the first case to carry the bad faith theory from the liability insurance cases to
a first party property insurance case. Some courts have held that fundamental differences
exist in the relationship between a liability insurer and its insured and between a property
insurer and its insured. E.g., Wilkie v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 896, 900
(D.S.C. 1981); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015,
1018-19 (1978). Gruenberg failed to recognize such differences.
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submit to examination under oath by the insurers' attorneys, and the insurers denied the claim on the basis of the insured's refusal. The insured sued
his insurers for policy proceeds and for tort damages beyond the policy
limits, alleging that the insurers acted in bad faith by falsely implying that
the insured had a motive to set the fire in order to avoid paying the insured's just claim. The insured sought tort damages, including emotional
upset, loss of earnings, and punitive damages. The trial court sustained the
insurers' demurrer to the bad faith theory, but the California Supreme
Court reversed, holding the allegations of bad faith sufficient to state a
cause of action.7' The court found that all insurance contracts contain an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and concluded, "[W]hen
the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim
of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort."' 72 The court held that damages for the bad faith refusal to pay an insured's claim could include payment for loss of property and mental distress. 73 California decisions after
Gruenberg have affirmed and further refined the bad faith theory. 74 Some
states have accepted the theory, 75 and others have rejected it. 76 Until English v. Fischer, Texas had done neither.
English v. Fischer arose from a dispute between a homeowner and his
mortgagee over fire insurance policy proceeds. After a fire loss, both the
homeowner and the mortgagee claimed the policy proceeds. The deed of
trust provided that in the event of fire loss the insurance proceeds would be
payable to the mortgagee. 77 The mortgagee wanted to exercise her rights
under the deed of trust to receive and to apply all the insurance proceeds
against the mortgage loan. 78 The insured wanted to use the proceeds to
repair the fire damage, and argued that the mortgagee should be prohibited from claiming the insurance money because applying the proceeds to
the mortgage debt would breach an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, which is inherent in every contract. The insurer interpleaded
the insurance proceeds and was discharged. The suit proceeded between
71. 9 Cal. 3d at 576, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
72. Id.
73. Id at 581, 510 P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
74. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818, 620 P.2d 141, 145, 169
Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (1979); Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15
Cal. 3d 9, 14-20, 538 P.2d 744, 747-51, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291-95 (1975); Schoolcraft v. Ross,
81 Cal. App. 3d 75, 81, 146 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (1978).
75. See Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 911 (Okla. 1982); MFA Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Flint, 574 S.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Tenn. 1978).
76. Tate v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 149 Ga. App. 123, 253 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1979);
Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 158 (1980); Kewin v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50, 56 (1980); Tyson v. Aetna
Life & Casualty Co., 75 A.D.2d 1023, 429 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1980).
77. The deed of trust provision read: "It is agreed and stipulated that... [the mortga-

gor].

. . shall

keep said property fully insured in some company or companies approved by

the holder of said indebtedness [the mortgagee], to whom the loss, if any, shall be payable
and by whom the policy shall be kept." 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 75.
78. The mortgagee had initially expressed willingness to endorse the insurance check to
the owner, but later refused to do so. Her attorney stated that while the house had been a

good deal for the owners when they bought it, it was now a good deal for the mortgagee.
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the homeowner and the mortgagee. The homeowner prevailed in the trial
court upon a jury finding that the mortgagee's refusal to endorse the insurance check over to the homeowner was a breach of an implied covenant of
the homeowner both polgood faith and fair dealing. The court awarded
79
icy proceeds and consequential damages.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for the homeowner, 80 but the supreme court reversed, thus squarely rejecting the California theory that underlay the judgments of the lower courts. 81 The court
stated that the bad faith theory would threaten a contracting party with
treble damages merely for seeking to compel performance due under the
contract. 82 The court, therefore, refused to create a separate tort action for
a bad faith breach of contract.
Seven justices signed the majority opinion. In overruling a motion for
rehearing, Justices Spears and Robertson concurred separately on the narrower ground that the duty of good faith dealing did not apply to the case
before it, because both parties were represented by counsel at the time the
deed of trust was given and, therefore, had entered a "fairly negotiated
'83
contract."
While English v. Fischer was a suit on a deed of trust, not an insurance
contract, its holding arguably precludes reliance on the bad faith tort theory in insurance policy suits. The argument against recognizing bad faith
as a cause of action in Texas is actually stronger in insurance policy cases
than in other contract cases, because of the heavy statutory regulation of
the insurance industry in Texas. 84 Other states with similar penal statutes
have declined to create new common law remedies. 85
79. The consequential damages totalled $127,616, the amount of increase in construction costs incurred by the owners due to the delay in receiving the insurance money.
80. 649 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982).
81. 660 S.W.2d at 522.
82. The court said:
This concept is contrary to our well-reasoned and long-established adver-

sary system which has served us ably in Texas for almost 150 years. Our system permits parties who have a dispute over a contract to present their case to

an impartial tribunal for a determination of the agreement as made by the
parties and embodied in the contract itself. To adopt the laudatory sounding

theory of "good faith and fair dealing" would place a party under the onerous
threat of treble damages should he seek to compel his adversary to perform

according to the contract terms as agreed upon by the parties. The novel concept advocated by the courts below would abolish our system of government

according to settled rules of law and let each case be decided upon what might
seem "fair and in good faith," by each fact finder. This we are unwilling to
do.

Id.
83. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 130 (Dec. 14, 1983).
84. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon Supp. 1984); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. arts. 21.21, .21-2 (Vernon 1981). Article 21.21-2 is also known as the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act.
85. E.g., Associated Photographers, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 677 F.2d 1251,
1258 (8th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 497, 501-02 n.5 (8th Cir.
1980); Tate v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 149 Ga. App. 123, 253 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1979);
Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 277 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149, 158 (1980);
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Attorney's Fees. In Texas FarmersInsurance Co. v. Hernandez86 the court
of appeals approved recovery of attorney's fees in a suit on a property
insurance policy under article 2226 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes,
despite language in the statute specifically excluding suits on insurance
policies from its scope. 87 The court recognized that the insurance company was entitled to attorney's fees only by statute because attorney's fees
are not recoverable at common law and the insurance contract itself did
not provide for recovery of attorney's fees.8 8 The court adopted a construction of the statute that originated in Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Burke. 89 In Burke the Texarkana court of appeals interpreted article 2226
to exempt suits on insurance contracts only when attorney's fees were recoverable under one of the other Insurance Code provisions listed in article 2226.90 This construction, in effect, allows recovery of attorney's fees in
all suits based on insurance contracts. 9 1 Thus, the court read the exclusionary language entirely out of the statute.
By following Burke, the Hernandez court ignored a line of decisions
holding that attorney's fees under article 2226 are not recoverable in a suit
based on a fire insurance policy. 92 For example, in StandardFire Insurance Co. v. Fraiman93 the court rejected a claim for attorney's fees, indicating that article 2226's provisions were inapplicable to a fire insurance
company because the company was subject to the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act and so was exempted. 94 Thus, two opposing lines of
cases have developed on the application of article 2226 to fire insurance
policies, and the question has not been resolved by the Texas Supreme
5
Court.

9

The Hernandez court also decided from what date prejudgment interest
should be calculated. The insured asserted that the prejudgment interest
should begin to run sixty days after the casualty because the policy required payment of proceeds within sixty days after proof of loss. The inD'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966, 969-70
(1981).
86. 649 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. Id at 125; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Article 2226

generally provides for recovery of attorney's fees in contract cases, but specifically excludes
suits arising under insurance contracts subject to specified Insurance Code provisions. TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
88. 649 S.W.2d at 123.
89. 614 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981), writ refdn.r.e. per curiam, 621
S.W.2d 596 (Tex. 1981).
90. 614 S.W.2d at 850.
91. Hernandez, 649 S.W.2d at 124.
92. Reynolds v. Allstate Ins. Co., 633 F.2d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 1981); Standard Fire Ins.
Co. v. Fraiman, 588 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chance, 582 S.W.2d 530, 533-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979), rev'd
on other grounds, 590 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1980).
93. 588 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
94. Id at 685.
95. The supreme court arguably favored a plain language approach to construction of
the statute in Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1983). The
court said, "Art. 2226 does not apply to contracts of certain insurors who are identified in
those sections of the Insurance Code enumerated in Art. 2226." Id at 775.
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sured's pleadings stated that he filed the proof of loss "immediately" after
the fire. The court disagreed, holding that in the absence of proof showing
interest begins on
the date the proof of loss was submitted, prejudgment
96
the date of the insurer's denial of liability.
'Actual Cash Value." In Custom Controls Co. v. Ranger Insurance97 the
Houston court of appeals considered the proper measure of replacement
cost for goods manufactured by the insured. Fire destroyed four wellhead
control panels manufactured by the insured, Custom Controls. Custom
Controls submitted a claim under its Ranger Insurance policy, and Ranger
paid $79,536.30, which represented the cost to the insured of remanufacturing the panels. The insured claimed entitlement to $237,248, the price
the panels would have been sold for had no fire occurred. Custom Controls had manufactured the panels pursuant to a purchase order from National Iranian Gas Company. The purchase order provided for inspection
and acceptance by an agent of the buyer, but the inspection had not taken
place at the time of the fire. The portion of the policy controlling valuation for claim purposes provided that the insured could recover the actual
cash value of lost or damaged property, which was not to exceed the cost to
repair or replace the property with material of like kind and quality. 98
The insured contended that the cost of replacement should be determined
by the amount required to purchase similar panels, fully manufactured,
from a third party, rather than the cost of remanufacture by the insured.
The insurer contended that the cost of remanufacture was the proper
measure.
The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the insurer,
holding that the actual cash value definition was not ambiguous and that
the proper measure of recovery under the policy provision was the cost to
the insured of remanufacturing the panels. 99 This holding is consistent
with earlier rulings and with the fundamental concept of indemnity inherent in all insurance, in that it repays actual loss but does not include a
profit or mark-up.' °
Notice of Loss Versus Notice of Claim. In a per curiam opinion refusing
the insurer's application for writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court in St.
96. 649 S.W.2d at 126.
97. 652 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. App.-Houston 1983, no writ).
98. The policy provision read:
All other property-The actual cash value of the property at the time any loss
or damage occurs and the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated
according to such actual cash value with prop((.eduction for depreciation, however caused, and shall in no event exceed what it would then cost to repairor
replace the same with material of like kind and quality.
Id. at 451 (emphasis added by court).
99. Id at 453.

100. See Crisp v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. 1963); Northwestern
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Cope, 448 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, no writ).
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Paul Mercury Insurance v. Tri-State Cattle Feeders, Inc. I distinguished
between notice of claim and notice of loss. St. Paul issued an insurance
policy to Tri-State that required notice of loss within twenty-four hours
after the loss occurred. The claim arose because of the nefarious dealings
of a cattle buyer. After delivery of the cattle by Tri-State, the buyer's draft
was dishonored. Tri-State made several unsucessful attempts to collect the
money, and the buyer was eventually convicted of theft. Tri-State gave St.
Paul notice of the theft some four months after it occurred. After the verdict in the first trial was invalidated for jury misconduct, Tri-State recovered judgment in a second trial upon a jury finding that the notice
provisions were unreasonable and that Tri-State gave notice within a reasonable period. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the twentyfour-hour notice provision was void because it required a notice of claim
days, thus violating article 5546(a) of the Texas Revised
in less than ninety
0 2
Civil Statutes.
In its application for writ of error the insurer contended that the court of
appeals erred in holding the notice provision statutorily void. The
supreme court agreed. The statute invalidates any policy provision requiring notice of a claim for damages within a period less than ninety days
from the date of loss. The policy provision in question, however, required
notice within twenty-four hours of "every loss which may become a
claim."' 0 3 The court held such a notice of loss provision permissible under
the statute but declined to grant the writ of error because the jury had
found the twenty-four-hour notice of loss provision to be unreasonable
under the circumstances.'°4
Constructive Trustfor InsuranceProceeds. In IndianaLumbermens Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Metro MaterialMarketing, Inc. 105 the Dallas court of appeals considered whether a purchaser who held equitable title to a piece of
property could recover under the vendor's insurance policy, the proceeds
of which were assigned to the purchaser after the loss. The purchaser contracted to buy a lot and a partially constructed building. Before closing,
fire destroyed the building, and the purchaser had no insurance in effect.
The seller, however, was fully covered. After the fire the purchaser completed the sale, accepting the lot and an assignment of the seller's insur101.

638 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. 1982). The court refused the writ of error with the notation,

"no reversible error."

102. 628 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982). Article 5546(a) provides:
No stipulation in a contract requiring notice to be given of a claim for damages as a condition precedent to the right to sue thereon shall ever be valid
unless such stipulation is reasonable. Any such stipulation fixing the time
within which such notice shall be given at a less period than ninety (90) days
shall be void, and when any such notice is required, the same may be given to
the nearest or to any other convenient local agent of the company requiring
the same.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5546(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
103. 638 S.W.2d at 869.
104. Id.
105. 646 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
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ance claim. The insurer denied the claim on the ground that the assignorseller had suffered no loss, since the sale was completed for the original
price. The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment for the
purchaser.
The court of appeals agreed that the purchaser should recover, and established an exception to the rule of ParamountFireInsurance Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.'0 6 Paramount Fire held that when a loss occurred
after the real estate contract was signed but before closing, the contract was
later performed at the original price, and both parties were protected by
insurance, the purchaser's insurance company should pay the loss "because the insured vendors suffered no pecuniary loss to premises destroyed
by fire while under the contract of sale, which was ultimately completed." 0 7 The Paramount Fire court expressly left open the question of
whether a different result would be reached when the vendee had no insurance. 1 08 Considering the entire transaction in Indiana Lumbermens, including events after the fire, the court of appeals acknowledged that the
seller did not suffer a loss, but held that the purchaser who had suffered a
loss should receive the benefit of the insurance.' 0 9 The court held that
when the purchaser has no insurance, the seller can recover on its policy
subject to a constructive trust for the purchaser." 0 The summary judgment was reversed, however, due to insufficient evidence establishing
damages. I" I
"Compulsory" in Marine Coverage. In Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza
Corp. 112 the Fifth Circuit interpreted a marine protection and indemnity
insurance policy that covered all amounts a vessel owner was legally liable
to pay for the removal of a wrecked vessel when that removal was "com' 3
pulsory by law" or "in connection with any fixed or movable object.""
Conoco, which operated an offshore drilling rig, chartered a vessel from
Bonanza. The vessel sank beneath the rig, and Conoco removed the
wreck. Conoco sought to recover the cost of removal under a standard
marine protection and indemnity policy, which named it and Bonanza as
insureds.
The court first dealt with the question of whether the removal was compulsory by law. The court refused to follow the Second Circuit, which
found this phrase to be a term of art, and instead construed the words in
their ordinary sense.' 14 Thus the court interpreted "compulsory by law" to
mean that removal is "compulsory when a reasonable owner, fully informed, would conclude that failure to remove would likely expose him to
106. 163 Tex. 250, 353 S.W.2d 841 (1962).

107. 646 S.W.2d at 549; see 163 Tex. at 256, 353 S.W.2d at 845.
108. 163 Tex. at 256, 353 S.W.2d at 845.
109. 646 S.W.2d at 549-50.
110. Id. at 550.

Ill. Id
112. 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).

113. Id. at 1367.
114. Id. at 1369.
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liability imposed by law sufficiently great in amount and probability of
occurrence to justify the expense of removal."" 5 The duty to remove must
be present and unconditional, and may be imposed by any law." l6 The
court concluded that, under the circumstances, the insured's removal of the
17
wrecked ship was not compulsory by law."
The court next addressed the issue of whether the insured could recover
the removal costs under a clause providing indemnity of sums that "as
owner [Conoco]. . . shall have become legally liable to pay and shall have
paid on account of [floss of, or damage to, or expense in connection with
any fixed or movable object .... ,18 The court found that this clause
provided indemnification "for sums paid in consequence of damage to and
expense incurred in connection with property, contemplating reparative
measures," but it did not cover expenses taken to avert liability." 9 The
court concluded that this provision did not provide coverage for expenses
incurred in removing the wreck because the insured was under no legal
20
obligation to remove the wrecked vessel.'
Five judges dissented, arguing that the majority's interpretation of
"compulsory at law" changed the "crafted and balanced test" of Progress
Marine to require a statutorily imposed present and unconditional legal
duty.' 2' The dissent took what it considered the more reasonable and
practical approach and concluded that the insured was compelled by law
to remove the wreck because it was faced with a large amount of potential
liability as compared to the relatively small cost of removal. 122
IV. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND THE TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
Parties Who May Sue. The Texarkana court of appeals held in Rosell v.
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. 123 that neither an additional
insured, who did not purchase the insurance policy, nor the assignee of
that additional insured was a consumer as defined by the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA). 124 Only consumers, as defined by the DTPA, may
sue under that Act. Rosell sued the insureds, Wood and his parents, on
behalf of her daughter for personal injuries and on her own behalf for
emotional distress, alleging damages arising from an automobile accident
115. Id at 1372. This test is similar to one adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Progress
Marine, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 642 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860

(1981). The full court, however, eliminated the subjective element imposed by the Progress
Marine panel, which asked "'whether removal was performed as a result of a subjective
belief on the part of the insured that such was reasonably necessary ....
1371 (quoting ProgressMarine, 642 F.2d at 820).

.

706 F.2d at

116. 706 F.2d at 1372-73.
117. Id at 1373.
118. Id at 1374 (emphasis added by court).
119. Id
120. Id

121. Id at 1378 (Williams, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 1379.
123. 642 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
124. Id. at 279. The DTPA is codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANNi. §§ 17.41-.63
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
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in which a vehicle driven by Wood struck Rosell's daughter. Wood's parents had purchased an automobile insurance policy from Farmers, and
Wood was an additional insured under the policy. Rosell refused Farmers' settlement offer of $10,000 for her daughter's injuries and $5000 for
her own injuries. The policy limits on bodily injury were $10,000 per person and $20,000 per occurrence. The suit resulted in a take-nothing judgment as to Wood's parents and a judgment for $60,625 against Wood.
Following that suit, Rosell secured an assignment from the Woods of their
claims against Farmers for its failure to negotiate a settlement within policy limits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers
in Rosell's suit against Farmers, in which she alleged on behalf of herself,
her daughter, and the Woods that "Farmers committed an unconscionable
action, failed to negotiate in good25 faith for settlement, and breached its
implied warranty of good faith."'
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Rosell did not have a
cause of action under the DTPA because neither she nor Wood was a consumer.' 26 The DTPA defines consumers as individuals who seek or acquire "by purchase or lease any goods or services."' 127 The court found
that Rosell was not a consumer because she did not purchase the insurance
policy from Farmers. 28 She could derive a claim from Wood's assignment, but not from his parents' assignment because no judgment was rendered against them. Wood, however, was not a consumer because his
parents, not he, had purchased the insurance policy.' 29 Further, the court
found that the insurance company's failure to negotiate a settlement did
not give rise to a cause of action under the DTPA because the failure was
post-sale conduct by the insurer, which is not actionable under the DTPA
because it does not occur in connection with the purchase of goods or services.' 30 Thus, even if Rosell or Wood had been consumers, Farmers' actions could not have resulted in a finding of DTPA violations.' 3'
125. 642 S.W.2d at 279.
126. Id.
127. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The statutory defi-

nition includes partnerships, corporations, and government entities as well as individuals.
Id.
128. 642 S.W.2d at 279.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing American Ins. Cos. v. Reed, 626 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1981, no writ)).
131. 642 S.W.2d at 279. The court of appeals also interpreted the Stowers Doctrine,
which governs an insurer's negligent failure to settle as it applies in the two-claim situation.

The doctrine "allows an insured to recover from his insurer the entire amount of a judgment
rendered against him if, prior to the judgment, the insurer negligently failed to accept a
settlement offer within the liability limits of the insurance policy between them." Id at 279-

80 (emphasis in original). The court held no duty was breached if the insurer refused to pay
up to its per occurrence limits in a situation where the parties made two claims, one that

could result in an excess judgment and the other that was within the insurer's per person
limit. Thus, the per person limit is the maximum amount the insurer is required to offer to
each claimant. Id at 280. The court reasoned that setting this maximum would discourage
the use of per occurrence policy limits "as 'trust funds' to divide between various plaintiffs as
they see fit" and discourage "requiring insurance companies to accept 'package deal' settlements from multiple claimants." Id Because Farmers offered to settle Rosell's daughter's
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In St. Paul Insurance Co. v. McPeak 32 the Houston court of appeals
refused to apply the statutory remedies for unfair or bad faith settlement
practices provided in article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, which allows
treble damages for unfair insurance practices, 133 to actions brought under
the Worker's Compensation Act. 134 The plaintiff alleged that the insurance company committed unfair practices by terminating his benefits. The
plaintiff had received benefits for several months when his claim was reviewed. The insurance company concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled and terminated his benefits. The plaintiff sued the insurance
company, and a jury found that the company had violated article 21.21.
Based on this finding, the trial court tripled the plaintiffs statutory award
of worker's compensation benefits.
The court of appeals gave three reasons for refusing to apply article
21.21. First, the award of worker's compensation benefits did not constitute actual damages as defined by section 16 of article 21.21. Actual damages under section 16 include only those damages recoverable at common
35
Seclaw, while worker's compensation benefits are statutory awards.
ond, actual damages must be presented to the jury by special issue. In this
case the court only presented the jury with issues concerning disability and
unfair insurance practices, not actual damages. 3 6 Third, the trial court
erred in trebling the disability award because worker's compensation benefits and article 21.21 damages have "separate and independent statutory
bases." 137 According to the court, the provisions of the two acts should not
138
The
be commingled because the purposes of the statutes are distinct.
court found that the purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act is to ensure compensation for the worker for loss of earning capacity and to limit
the amount the worker can recover. 139 The court arguably is indicating
that the balance between the recovery of the worker and the liability of the
employer should not be disturbed by applying article 21.21 principles to
the Worker's Compensation Act. The court specifically limited its decision
as holding that the remedies provided by article 21.21 do not apply to suits
brought under the Worker's Compensation Act. 140 The court refused to
decide whether actions for unfair insurance practices can be brought
against a compensation carrier, whether article 21.21 is applicable to unclaim at the per person policy limits and Rosell's award on her own injuries was below the
per person limits, Farmers did not breach its duty. Id This interpretation is in accord with
that of other jurisdictions cited by the court. See, e.g., Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Winget,
197 F.2d 97, 103-05 (9th Cir. 1952); Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 185
So. 2d 619, 625 (La. Ct. App. 1966); Clark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 61 Tenn.
App. 596, 457 S.W.2d 35, 39 (1970).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

641 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309.1 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1984).
641 S.W.2d at 287.
Id.
Id at 288.
Id.
Id at 286, 288.
Id. at 288.
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fair or bad faith settlement practices, or whether the plaintiffs allegations
14 1
were otherwise actionable.
Limitations. The Fifth Circuit in Marcotte v. American Motorists Insurance
Co. 142 applied a two-year statute of limitations period to claims brought
under the Texas DTPA in cases arising prior to the 1979 amendments to
the Act, and in which the claim is not evidenced by a contract in writing.' 4 3 In this case a jury found that Marcotte, the plaintiff, was permanently and totally disabled as defined by his disability insurance policy,
and that the insurer, American Motorists (AMIC), violated the DTPA by
making misrepresentations at the time Marcotte became insured. 144
When this cause of action arose, the DTPA did not include a limitations
period for misrepresentation claims. 145 Thus the court faced the question
of what statute of limitations applied. Article 5526(4) of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes provided a two-year statute of limitations period for suits in
which "the indebtedness was not evidenced by a contract in writing.' 46
Marcotte's claim for misrepresentations under the DTPA was not based
upon a written contract. Further, Texas courts have long held that claims
for statutory damages are actions in debt and thus fall under the two-year
limitations period provided in article 5526(4). 147 Additionally, a two-year
limitations period has traditionally been applied to claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation. 148 Therefore, the court concluded that the applicable
limitations period was two years, and that Marcotte's claim was barred.149
Marcotte claimed that, due to AMIC's misrepresentations, he was unaware
that the policy did not provide the type of disability benefits he thought he
141. Id. On a motion for rehearing, the court ruled that the trial court erred in refusing
the plaintiffs motion to sever the worker's compensation claim from the art. 21.21 claims,
and affirmed the worker's compensation award, but reversed and remanded the art. 21.21
claim. Id. at 288-89.
142. 709 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1983).
143. Id at 380.
144. The policy defined two types of total disability. During the first two years following
an injury, an employee was totally disabled if he was unable to perform all aspects of his
occupation. After two years, total disability consisted of the complete inability of an employee to engage in every occupation for which he was trained.
145. In August 1979 the legislature amended the DTPA to provide a two-year statute of
limitations for all DTPA actions. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56A (Vernon Supp.
1984).
146. 709 F.2d at 380; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The
court in Marcotte noted that id.art. 5527 now provides a four-year statute of limitations
period in an action on a debt, whether or not the indebtedness is evidenced by or founded
upon a written contract. 709 F.2d at 380 n.l.
147. See Rose v. First State Bank, 122 Tex. 298, 302, 59 S.W.2d 810, 811 (1933) (cause of
action against insolvent bank for return of funds deposited barred by two-year statute of
limitations); Overton v. City of Houston, 564 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (suit against city of Houston to compel payment of termination pay barred by two-year statute limitations).
148. Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 84-85 (Tex. 1981) (two-year statute applied to bar
action against estate for fraudulent misrepresentation about will); Reynolds-Southwestern
Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 438 S.W.2d 135, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (two-year statute applied to bar cross-action on unfair appropriation
of trade secrets and fraudulent inducement to execute contract).
149. 709 F.2d at 380-81.
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would receive. Marcotte discovered the misrepresentation in July 1976,
however, and did not file suit until December 1979. Thus he had not filed
his claim within the limitation period and was barred.' 50

150. Id. at 380.

